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Abstract—Mobile devices are used more and more in everyday
life. They are our cameras, wallets, and keys. Basically, they
embed most of our private information in our pocket. For this
and other reasons, mobile devices, and in particular the software
that runs on them, are considered first-class citizens in the
software-vulnerabilities landscape. Several studies investigated
the software-vulnerabilities phenomenon in the context of mobile
apps and, more in general, mobile devices. Most of these studies
focused on vulnerabilities that could affect mobile apps, while just
few investigated vulnerabilities affecting the underlying platform
on which mobile apps run: the Operating System (OS). Also,
these studies have been run on a very limited set of vulnerabilities.
In this paper we present the largest study at date investigating
Android-related vulnerabilities, with a specific focus on the
ones affecting the Android OS. In particular, we (i) define a
detailed taxonomy of the types of Android-related vulnerability;
(ii) investigate the layers and subsystems from the Android OS
affected by vulnerabilities; and (iii) study the survivability of
vulnerabilities (i.e., the number of days between the vulnerability
introduction and its fixing). Our findings could help OS and apps
developers in focusing their verification & validation activities,
and researchers in building vulnerability detection tools tailored
for the mobile world.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, mobile apps have powered a whole
new economy that substantially impacted the software market.
The cultural popularity of mobile devices, the new monetiza-
tion/revenue models the apps’ market propose, and the capillary
distribution infrastructure represented by app stores, are only
some of the driving factors making apps an attractive market
for software developers. Also, the need for “enterprise apps"
that support startups or serve as a new front-end for traditional
companies is pushing software-related professionals to embrace
the mobile technologies [1].
From the users’ perspective, mobile apps and devices are a
mechanism for achieving ubiquity, allowing them to perform
multiple tasks and daily activities from anywhere, and to always
have available at the touch of their hands important/sensitive
information. Consequently, the security of mobile apps and of
the underlying platforms on which they run has become a big
concern for researchers and practitioners, due to the impact that
security issues affecting mobile platforms might have on the
private life of individuals (e.g., allowing to stole private files)
as well as on companies (e.g., allowing to intercept strategic
business decisions) [2]–[4].
Recently, the impact of those vulnerabilities in everyday life
has been more evident to the society due to public announce-
ments of malware and vulnerabilities in mobile platforms
that compromise sensitive information and/or computational
resources in the affected devices. In 2015 mobile malware
reached a tremendous +153% (Android) and +235% (iOS) in
the number of reported threats as compared to the previous
year [4]. Representative examples of mobile malware with
notorious impact are games such as “Cowboy adventure"
and “Jump chess" that infected about 1 million devices [5],
the Locker trojan [3], [4] for Android, and the XcodeGhost
malware that infected 40K+ apps from the Apple App Store
[4]. Also, according to the CVE details portal [6], 125 and 523
vulnerabilities in the Android OS were reported in 2015, and
2016, respectively. One of those vulnerabilities is “Stagefright"
[7]–[9] that compromised 95% of the Android devices in 2015.
As a contribution from the research community, substantial
effort has been recently invested in the analysis and detection
of malware and vulnerabilities at the applications level (see
e.g., [10]–[12]). However, (i) few works have focused on
the vulnerabilities at the OS level [13]–[17], the underlying
platform on which any app runs, and (ii) most of the studies
have just focused on a limited number of vulnerabilities.
In this paper, we present an empirical study aimed at
analyzing from several different perspectives Android-related
vulnerabilities, with a specific focus on those affecting the
Android OS. In particular, we study (i) the types of vulnerability,
(ii) the layers and subsystems from the Android OS affected by
vulnerabilities, and (iii) the survivability of vulnerabilities (i.e.,
the number of days between the vulnerability introduction and
its fixing). While previous studies have focused the attention
on a small set of vulnerabilities (e.g., 11 in [14], 1 in [13], and
32 in [15]), we mined all the vulnerabilities (660) available in
the official Android bulletins and the CVE-details portal up to
November 2016. The vast majority of our study has been carried
out via manual analysis of vulnerability-related documents
available on issue trackers, versioning system, official Android
security bulletins, and information available on the National
Vulnerability Database [18].
Knowing the types of security vulnerabilities affecting the
Android devices and their characteristics can help to guide (i)
apps developers, in focusing their verification & validation
activities toward the identification of the most frequently
reported types of vulnerability, (ii) researchers, in investing
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in vulnerabilities detection tools targeting the most diffused
types of Android-related vulnerabilities (thus being particularly
valuable to increase the security of Android devices), and (iii)
language/API developers, to design/improve mechanisms for
secure coding of Android apps and the underlying platform.
As a result of our study we defined a detailed taxonomy
of vulnerabilities affecting Android devices (Fig. 2) based on
the Common Weaknesses Enumeration [50], and identified
the layers/subsystems of the Android OS mostly impacted by
vulnerabilities (Fig. 4). We found that the hardware drivers in
the lowest level of the Android OS stack (i.e.,, linux kernel),
and the native libraries are the layers mostly impacted by
security vulnerabilities, and the lack of secure coding practices
for restricting operations in the bounds of memory buffers is
the main source of vulnerabilities. In addition, we found that
Android-related security vulnerabilities survive for very long
time (at least 724 days, on average).
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The Android OS is an open source mobile OS developed
by Google and based on the Linux Kernel. It is composed
of a set of architectural layers that follows a software stack
model, having the Linux Kernel as the foundation, and an
Applications layer as the closest interaction point for the
end users. Each layer is composed of subsystems/components
mostly implemented in Java and C/C++. Some of those
components are developed by third-party contributors of
the Android open source project (AOSP), such as original
equipment manufacturers (OEM) and Linux contributors.
The Android OS stack is composed by the following layers:
Applications: software running on the device that uses
the Android APIs to implement specific features, like geo-
localization. The components in this layer are the mobile “apps"
we use daily such as Browser, Calendar, and Settings; these
apps are mostly written in Java.
Android Framework: provides apps (and developers)
with the building blocks and common tasks required for
exposing/using device- and Android-specific features such as
managing UI elements and sensors. The Android Framework
contains the Android APIs and Android managers (a.k.a.,
services); examples of these services are the View System
and the Activity Manager. This layer is implemented in Java.
Runtime: contains the Virtual Machine (Dalvik/ART) and
the core libraries required for the execution of apps and services
on the device. Runtime is required for ensuring apps portability
across different devices. Examples of the core libraries in the
Runtime layer are the independent implementation of Java used
by Android and the Bouncy castle library.
Native Libraries: provide low level functionality and
computational intensive services required by the Android
Framework and the Runtime, such as the Bionic libc library,
the WebKit browser engine, OpenGL, SSL, and the Media
Framework. The libraries are written in C/C++.
Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL): it is the
bridge between the high level representations of the hardware
used in the libraries, and low level representations used by
the kernel. It is a set of interfaces for hardware-specific
software that needs to be implemented by OEMs and hardware
manufacturers. Components in the HAL are written in C/C++.
Linux Kernel: it provides the Android OS with core
OS systems infrastructure, a security model, networking, and
memory and process management, among the others. Android
uses a modified version of Linux tailored to mobile devices.
For more details of the Android OS architecture, we point
the interested reader to the following sources: [19]–[21].
A. Malware and Vulnerabilities
The wide and rapid adoption of Android-based devices in
the last years has motivated the usage of Android apps to
support a broad range of daily activities. In that sense, being
the most popular mobile platform makes it an attractive target
for security attacks [22]. In fact, the number and complexity of
the attacks to Android-based systems is increasing drastically
[22]; since 2008, Android-related vulnerabilities have been
reported including critical issues such as the “Heartbleed"
[23] flaw in the SSL library, and the “Stagefright" flaw in the
media framework [7]–[9] that has infected 95% of the Android
devices in 2015. As a consequence, the industry has improved
the security mechanisms and services in the Android ecosystem
[24] and designed mobile-specific malware detectors.
Researchers have also contributed to improve the security of
the Android ecosystem by analyzing security vulnerabilities and
proposing improvements to current security models [12], [16],
[17], [22], [25]–[32], [32]–[35]; however, while the focus of the
academic research has been the security of the applications—
the closest component to the user—, the core of the Android
ecosystem (i.e., the Android OS) has received little attention.
1) Security in Android Applications: Android malware and
vulnerabilities in Android apps are characterized by a novel set
of flaws that exploit user level weaknesses and the issues in
security mechanisms of the Android OS. For instance, Android-
specific attacks include (i) privileges/permissions escalation
through pairs of infected apps that exploit inter-application
communication or misconfigured apps [10]–[12], [35], [36],
(ii) applications tapjacking/hijacking by apps repackaging
and substitution [26], (iii) information leaking through covert
channels [37], [38], (iv) SSL vulnerabilities in hybrid [33]
and native apps [32], (v) security issues introduced by third
party libraries [34], and (vi) security issues introduced by
OS customizations [28]. These novel attacks, in addition to
classic security attacks induced by malware (e.g., DoS), have
been widely studied by the community and several approaches
have been proposed for their detection and mitigation, such
as TaintDroid [39], COVERT [10], [11], FlowDroid [40],
MudFlow [41], Chabada [42], Q-Floid [43], and AppInspector
[44]. Other resources, like the Android Malware Genome
Project (Malgenome) [45], aim at characterizing Android
malware families by describing installation methods, activation
mechanisms, and malicious payloads; the Malgenome project
includes 1,200 malware samples collected from August 2010 to
October 2011. For more details we refer the interested reader
to the works by Zhou et al. [29] and Sufatrio et al. [30] that
widely describe Android malware and detection techniques,
and a recent work by Sadeghi et al. [31] presenting a survey
of static analysis techniques for detecting Android malware.
2) Android OS Vulnerabilities: Previous studies focused
on the analysis of specific components of the OS and their
security issues. Bagheri et al. [16] analyzed the vulnerabilities
of the permission system in the OS; Cao et al. [17] analyzed
input validation mechanisms in the services/managers of the
Android Framework; Huang et al. [22] found 4 vulnera-
bilities (a.k.a., Android Stroke Vulnerabilities) in two services
of the Android Framework (i.e., Activity and Window
Manager) that can be used for DoS attacks and for inducing OS
soft-rebooting; Wang et al. [27] also analyzed the Android
Framework layer and found six unknown vulnerabilities in
three of its services (i.e., Activity Manager, Location Manager,
Mount Service), and two apps from the Applications layer
(i.e., SystemUI, Phone).
3) Mining-Based Studies: Closer to our study are the
previous works aimed at analyzing security vulnerabilities
by following a mining-based approach. Some of those studies
are Android-specific [13]–[15] while others are more general
in the sense that they aim at characterizing security bugs
[46], [47]. Thomas et al. [14] mined the OS updates installed
on 20k+ Android devices to measure the delivery time of
security updates for 11 vulnerabilities, and to establish a
scoring model of insecure devices; the results suggest that,
on average, 87.7% of the devices are exposed to at least one of
the analyzed vulnerabilities. Thomas [13] investigated the CVE-
2012-6636 [48] vulnerability on the JavaScript-to-Java interface
of the WebView API; 102k+ APKs were statically analyzed to
measure the number of apps in which the vulnerability could
be exploited. In addition, the lifetime of the vulnerability was
analyzed using an approach similar to [14].
Finally, Jimenez et al. [15] analyzed 32 vulnerabilities
from the CVE database [49] to identify the issues, involved
components, code complexity of the patches, and complexity
of the code methods/functions involved in the vulnerability.
The study presented in this paper is complementary to
previous studies in the sense that a larger set of vulnerabilities
(mined from CVE) is analyzed (660) and different perspectives
are included in the study such as the survivability time of the
vulnerabilities, subsystems and components of the Android
OS involved in the vulnerabilities, an extensive taxonomy of
security issues based on the Common Weakness Enumeration
(CWE) hierarchy of vulnerabilities [50], and a list of learned
lessons oriented to Android OS and apps developers.
III. STUDY DESIGN
The goal of the study is to investigate Android-related
security vulnerabilities reported over the past eight years (i.e.,
the whole history of the Android OS). The purpose is to (i)
define a taxonomy highlighting the types of Android-related
vulnerabilities as well as which of the Android OS subsystems
are more exposed to security issues, and (ii) investigate the time
needed to fix vulnerabilities in Android. The context consists
of 660 vulnerabilities mined from CVE Details [6], [49], a
cveId: The id of the vulnerability,
score: A score from 0 to 10 indicating the severity of the vulnerability,
description: A textual description of the vulnerability,
patchLinks: [Links to the patch(es) aimed at fixing this vulnerability],
type: [The type of the vulnerability automatically inferred],
confidentialityImpact: ability to access information (None/Partial/Complete),
integrityImpact: ability to modify information in the device (None/Partial/Complete),
availabilityImpact: impact on the availability of the device (None/Partial/Complete),
accessComplexity: complexity of the attack required for the exploition (Low/Med./High)
Fig. 1. Information stored for the vulnerabilities mined from CVE Details
vulnerability datasource processing XML feeds provided by
the National Vulnerability Database [18]. All the data used in
the study are available in our online appendix [51].
The study addresses the following research questions:
RQ1: Which types of security vulnerabilities affect Android?
This research question aims at identifying the types (e.g., inad-
equate encryption strength) of Android-related vulnerabilities
reported over the past eight years. Note that with “Android-
related” we refer to both vulnerabilities directly affecting code
components belonging to the Android OS, i.e., the components
of the Android software stack developed by Google, as well
as those related to third-party components (e.g., hardware
drivers, apps shipped with the devices) threatening the security
of Android devices. Also, we investigate (i) the impact on
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the vulnerabilities
(see Fig. 1 for a definition of these three properties), and (ii) the
complexity of the attack required to exploit the vulnerabilities
(accessComplexity in Fig. 1).
RQ2: Which are the Android subsystems more affected by
security vulnerabilities? The second research question sheds
the light on the Android subsystems more frequently affected
by security vulnerabilities. Note that in this case our focus
will be on the architecture of the Android OS, while less
emphasis will be given to vulnerabilities affecting third-party
components. Indeed, our goal is to point out to developers
(both apps developers as well as contributors of the Android
OS) which are the more risky services, APIs, apps, etc., in the
OS. This information can be used to better focus verification
& validation activities as well as to develop better Android-
specific tools for vulnerability detection and secure coding.
RQ3: How long does it take to fix security vulnerabilities
in Android? This research question studies the survivability of
the security vulnerabilities subject of our study. In particular,
we assess the number of days between the vulnerability
introduction and its fixing. RQ3’s findings could help in
assessing the usefulness of effective vulnerability detection
tools able to immediately catch an introduced vulnerability
(i.e., a long survivability of the vulnerabilities would indicate
the urge for such tools), and to identify the prevalence of
vulnerabilities across different versions of the OS.
A. Data Extraction and Analysis
The context of the study consists of 660 vulnerabilities
mined from the official Android Security Bulletins and the
CVE Details website [49]. The information was collected on
November 24, 2016. First, we built a web-based scraper that
went over all the 16 bulletins published by Google from August
2015 until November 2016, looking for CVE ids (using regular
expressions). In total, we found 564 CVE ids in the Android
Bulletins; 62 of them are reported as reserved, meaning that
the details of the vulnerability are not publicly available.
A second web scraper was then used to automatically
extract the details of each of the vulnerabilities listed in CVE
details under the category “Android” [6]; we collected 629
vulnerabilities from CVE details under the “Android” category.
Some of the non-reserved vulnerabilities (listed in the
bulletins) do not appear tagged as Android-related in the CVE
details website because they affect the Linux Kernel or third
party components (e.g., drivers). We found 31 vulnerabilities
in the bulletins not tagged as Android-related in CVE details.
Therefore, using the CVE ids from the bulletins we directly
scraped the information from CVE details, without relying
on the Android filter. At the end, we obtained information
for a total of 660 vulnerabilities (629 tagged as Android-
related + 31 not tagged as Android but listed in the bulletins).
Note that 159 of the collected 660 vulnerabilities are not
listed in the bulletins; those CVEs are mostly from drivers,
apps, and OS modifications of device manufacturer/vendors,
and vulnerabilities found before the first Google bulletin was
published (August 13, 2015).
For each of the selected vulnerabilities we stored a JSON
file reporting the information detailed in Fig. 1. This data was
complemented/fixed via manual analysis (as detailed below),
and then used to answer RQ1 and RQ2. In particular, once
extracted the information in Fig. 1 for each vulnerability, two
authors manually analyzed each vulnerability to:
1. Check and complement the vulnerability type automatically
inferred by CVE Details, and obtain its hierarchy. CVE Details
exploits a keywords-based mechanism to automatically infer the
type of each vulnerability according to the Common Weakness
Enumeration (CWE) dictionary [50]. Such an automatic process
can introduce imprecisions in the data. For this reason, two
authors analyzed all the information available about each
vulnerability (i.e., its page on the National Vulnerability
Database, fixing patches when publicly available, official
vulnerability bulletins, the Android issue tracker, etc.) to verify
the type of the vulnerability, identify the CWE hierarchy,
and consequently change/complement the classification (still
according to the CWE dictionary). Note that a vulnerability
can belong to multiple types having hierarchical relationships
between them. For example, a vulnerability can be classified
as (from the least to the most specialized category):
Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a
Memory Buffer→ Out-of-bounds Read→ Buffer Over-read
Overall, the manual analysis led to the change or comple-
menting (i.e., multiple types are assigned to the vulnerability,
including the one automatically inferred by CVE Details) of
the type provided by CVE Details for 68% of the analyzed
vulnerabilities.
2. Identify the subsystems affected by the vulnerability. The
authors analyzed the information in the National Vulnerability
Database (including, when available, the patches fixing the
vulnerability) as well as online documentation (e.g., the Android
issue tracker) to identify the code components affected by the
vulnerability. Firstly, a high-level classification was performed
(i.e., the vulnerability affects the Android OS components
developed by Google or third-party components).
Then, for the vulnerabilities affecting the Android OS, a
more fine-grained category was defined in order to identify the
affected architectural layer (e.g., Android runtime) and, more
specifically, the affected subsystem (e.g., Dalvik VM).
The above described manual analysis was performed in
three rounds. First, two authors (A1 and A2) manually
analyzed half of the 660 vulnerabilities each. Then, A1
checked the vulnerability types and the impacted architectural
layers/subsystems assigned by A2 and vice versa. Finally,
the authors discussed the 47 (7%) cases of disagreement,
reaching an agreement on the correct classification needed. One
vulnerability (CVE-2016-3877) has been excluded from the
study at this stage, since no information was available about it.
Also, in cases in which the two evaluators were undecided about
the specific type of vulnerability and/or about the subsystem
affecting the vulnerability, an “unclear” tag was assigned.
We answer RQ1 by presenting a taxonomy of the types
of vulnerabilities identified in the manual analysis as well as
descriptive statistics about their characteristics (e.g., impact on
confidentiality). The characteristics have not been manually
validated since they are mined by CVE Details directly from the
National Vulnerability Database [18]. Thus, we assume them
as correct. Concerning RQ2, we report a heat map showing the
distribution of vulnerabilities across the Android subsystems.
We complement our discussion with qualitative examples.
To answer RQ3 we need information not available in the
CVE Details datasource. In particular, we need to identify
the commits in which each vulnerability has been introduced
and fixed. As for the commit fixing each vulnerability, we
mined it from the Android Security Bulletins [52], issued
each month and reporting about the recently identified/fixed
vulnerabilities. The vulnerability-fixing commit is not available
for all the 660 Android-related vulnerabilities we collected from
the CVE Details datasource, because (i) some vulnerabilities
were reported before the first available bulletin, and (ii) the
fixing commit (see e.g., http://tinyurl.com/hrod7q9) is only
available for the subset of vulnerabilities fixed in the Android
open source project (e.g., it is not available for vulnerabilities
related to third-party components such as drivers). Note also
that, although the CVE reports include in some cases the
bug id, the ids are for the internal bug trackers of Google
and hardware manufactures, which are not publicly available.
For these reasons, the analysis for RQ3 is limited to a set of
201 vulnerabilities for which we identified the fixing commit.
Once identified the fixing commit, we used the SZZ algorithm
[53] to identify the commit introducing the vulnerability. The
algorithm relies on the annotation/blame feature of versioning
systems. Given a vulnerability-fixing commit VFk (where k
identifies the vulnerability), the approach works as follows:
1. For each file fi, involved in VFk and fixed in its revision
rel-fixi,k, we extract the file revision just before the vulnerability
fixing (rel-fixk − 1).
2. Starting from the revision rel-fixk − 1, for each source
code line in fi changed to fix the vulnerability k, the blame
feature of Git is used to identify the file revision where the
last change to that line occurred.
In doing that, blank lines and lines that only contain
comments are identified using an island grammar parser [54].
This produces, for each file fi, a set of ni,k fix-inducing
revisions rel-vulnerabilityi,j,k, j = 1 . . . ni,k.
Since more than one commit can be indicated by the SZZ
algorithm as responsible for inducing the vulnerability-fix,
there are time vulnerability ranges defined by lower (minimum
survivability) and upper bounds (maximum survivability).
Therefore, we answer RQ3 by following a meta analysis-
based procedure [55], [56]: The minimum and the maximum
survivability of the vulnerabilities (i.e., number of days between
the vulnerability introduction and fixing) are plotted using
forest plots with confidence intervals, and a central tendency
measure of the survivability is computed by using the random
effects model [56] (based on the recommendations by Cumming
[56]). The minimum survivability is the one observed when
considering the most recent commit identified by the SZZ
algorithm as the one that induced the vulnerability-fix. Vice
versa, the maximum survivability is observed when considering
the least recent commit identified by the SZZ algorithm as
the one that induced the vulnerability-fix. The forest plots are
depicted by considering a 95% confidence interval.
We also verify whether vulnerabilities having different
severity levels have different survivability. For this analysis, we
use the severity classification available in the Android bulletins
(low, moderate, high, and critical). In particular, we compare
the distributions of the survivability of the different categories
of vulnerabilities (e.g., low vs. moderate) via (i) forest plots,
and (ii) statistical tests. For the latter we exploit the Mann-
Whitney test [57] with results intended as statistically significant
at α = 0.05. To control the impact of multiple pairwise
comparisons (e.g., the survivability of the vulnerabilities having
low severity is compared against the survivability of those
having moderate, high, and critical severity), we adjust p-
values using the Holm’s correction [58]. We also estimate the
magnitude of the differences by using the Cliff’s Delta (d), a
non-parametric effect size measure [59] for ordinal data. We
follow well-established guidelines to interpret the effect size:
negligible for |d| < 0.10, small for 0.10 ≤ |d| < 0.33, medium
for 0.33 ≤ |d| < 0.474, and large for |d| ≥ 0.474 [59].
IV. RESULTS
This section discusses the quantitative results achieved in
our study according to the three formulated RQs. Also, we
complement quantitative data with qualitative examples, by
referring to specific vulnerabilities identified with their CVE
id (e.g.,CVE-2016-2439). The reader can access the page
detailing a vulnerability by visiting “https://web.nvd.nist.gov/
view/vuln/detail?vulnId=” followed by the CVE id. Due to
the lack of space we only discuss a limited set of examples.
However, in our online appendix [51] we provide the complete
list of vulnerabilities considered in our study, including their
categorization by subsystem, component, and vulnerability type.
Also, we created visualizations aimed at helping the reader
when browsing the vulnerabilities list [51].
A. Which types of security vulnerabilities affect Android?
Fig. 2 shows the taxonomy reporting the vulnerability types
we found in the 660 manually inspected vulnerabilities. As
explained in Section III-A, the vulnerability types are depicted
in a hierarchical manner by following the categorization
provided in the CWE dictionary [50]. Note that Fig. 2 only
reports the classification for 510 vulnerabilities. This is due
to the fact that we were not able to infer the type of 150
vulnerabilities during our manual analysis.
The vulnerabilities most frequently affecting Android devices
are those related to weaknesses that affect the memory,
with 103 instances (20%). These weaknesses include all
vulnerabilities related to the improper restriction of operations
in the bounds of memory buffer, like out-of-bounds read/write.
One vulnerability falling in this category is CVE-2016-2439,
described as follows:
Buffer overflow in btif_dm.c in Bluetooth [...] allows
attackers to execute arbitrary code via a long PIN value
The vulnerability was fixed in commit 9b534de, modify-
ing the conditional statement checking a PIN-related error
from if (pin_code == NULL) to if (pin_code ==
NULL || pin_len > PIN_CODE_LEN). The rationale
behind the change is also documented by the developer in
the commit message: If a malicious client set a pin that was
too long it would overflow the pin code memory.
Very popular are also vulnerabilities related to data han-
dling, typically found in functionalities that process data [50]
(74 instances—15%). These include, for example, type errors
like the one related to CVE-2016-3918:
AttachmentProvider.java in AOSP Mail in Android [...] does
not ensure that certain values are integers, which allows
attackers to read arbitrary attachments [...]
The vulnerability was fixed in commit 6b2b0bd that, as
reported in the commit message: Limits account id and id
to longs [...] Both id and account id are now parsed into
longs (and if either fails, an error will be logged and null will
be returned). Note that the data handling category includes
several different sub-categories that we do not detail due to
lack of space (see Fig. 2).
Vulnerabilities related to permissions, privileges, and ac-
cess control are represented in our taxonomy with 58 instances
(11%). They include, for example, weaknesses due to improper
access control and to permission issues, like the cookie forcing
vulnerability discussed in CVE-2008-7298:
The Android browser cannot properly restrict modifications
to cookies established in HTTPS sessions, which allows
man-in-the-middle attackers to overwrite or delete arbitrary
cookies via a Set-Cookie header in an HTTP response [...]
Improper input validation (51 instances—10%) includes
vulnerabilities caused by a missing or improper validation of
inputs that can affect the control/data flow of the program [50].
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Fig. 3. RQ1: Impact of the vulnerability exploitation
Vulnerabilities in this category include (but are not limited to—
see Fig. 2) unchecked input for loop condition and improper
validation of function arguments.
The latter are the most popular in this category and,
while their fixing is generally simple (e.g., the addition of a
missing/improper argument validation), they can result in severe
attacks like the one possible by exploiting CVE-2016-3910
(9.3 out of 10 in severity score).
Security features are involved in 44 vulnerabilities (9%)
related to cryptographic issues, user interface security issues,
credentials management problems, etc. (see Fig. 2). For
example, CVE-2011-2344 reports a vulnerability due to
inadequate encryption strength possibly causing severe attacks
allowing the stealing of private pictures:
Android Picasa in Android [...] uses a cleartext HTTP
session when transmitting the authToken obtained from
ClientLogin, which allows remote attackers to gain privi-
leges and access private pictures and web albums by sniffing
the token from connections with picasaweb.google.com
Initialization and cleanup errors and improper check
or handling of exceptional conditions are the cause for 33
and 30, respectively, of the categorized vulnerabilities (∼6%
each). These categories include, among others, the missing
initialization of a variable and uncaught exceptions.
Finally, other less diffused vulnerabilities are those falling in
the categories: Indicator of poor quality code (27 instances),
behavioral problems (21), time and state (14), injection
flaws (6), improper fulfilment of API contract (4), and
weaknesses that affect files or directories (3). A description
of these categories can be found in the CWE dictionary [50],
while Android-related examples from our dataset are available
in our online appendix [51].
1) Characteristics of the Android-related vulnerabilities: We
discuss the characteristics of the vulnerabilities in terms of their
access complexity and availability, integrity, and confidentiality
impact (see Fig. 1 for a definition of these characteristics).
Access complexity. Very few vulnerabilities (21) require a
high access complexity, meaning that (i) the vulnerability is
difficult to exploit, and (ii) specific conditions must verify to
allow the exploitation. Most of the vulnerabilities have either
a medium (399) or low (238) access complexity. Note that
having a low access complexity (i.e., very little knowledge
needed to exploit the vulnerability) does not imply a lower
severity for the effects for the exploitation. Indeed, 130 of these
vulnerabilities in our dataset (i.e., 55% of all those having a
low access complexity) cause a complete confidentiality (i.e.,
total information disclosure), integrity (i.e., total compromise
of system integrity), and availability (i.e., total unavailability
of the targeted device resources, like CPU) impact.
Impact of the exploitation. Fig. 3 reports the impact on
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the studied vulner-
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Fig. 4. RQ2: Heat map of vulnerabilities in the Android layers/subsystems
abilities. Green indicates no impact, orange a partial impact,
and red a complete impact.
Most of the Android-related vulnerabilities can seriously
compromise the confidentiality and integrity of the information
stored in the device and can cause a complete exhaustion of the
device’s resources. This highlights the urge for techniques and
tools supporting the detection of Android-related vulnerabilities
at different stages: development, submission to the market, and
execution in the device.
B. Which are the Android subsystems more affected by security
vulnerabilities?
Fig. 4 depicts (using a heat-map style), the manually
identified layers and subsystems of the Android OS impacted
by 634 vulnerabilities. For building the heatmap, from the 660
vulnerabilities dataset, we excluded 26 in which we were not
able to manually identify the layer. For the heat-map we used
two color schemes: white-to-red for the layers, with white
representing the lowest value and red the highest one; and
white-to-yellow for the subsystems (i.e., internal boxes), with
full yellow meaning that a subsystem is responsible for 100%
of the vulnerabilities in the corresponding layer. Note that
the subsystems’ colors are normalized on the basis of the
total vulnerabilities affecting a layer. Fig. 4 also reports the
percentage of vulnerabilities affecting each layer.
Linux Kernel is the most frequently affected layer, with
261 of the 634 vulnerabilities (41%). It is worth noting
that the Android Open Source Project includes modifications
to the original kernel to enable mobile features. However,
most of the vulnerabilities in this layer affect third-party
drivers developed by hardware manufactures (OEMs): 237
vulnerabilities are in third-party drivers, while only 14 are
from Google changes/contributions to the kernel and are
related to Android-specific components such as Binder,
ashmem/Shared memory, and aboot/Boot loader.
For 10 of the 261 vulnerabilities we were not able to identify
whether they affect kernel components contributed by Google or
by OEMs. For third-party drivers, Video, WiFi, and Camera
are the top three hardware components/features involved in the
vulnerabilities. In the case of the Android-specific components,
most of the reported vulnerabilities (8 out of 14) are located
in the Bootloader, and correspond to overflow/over-read
issues, improper check or handling of exceptional conditions
[60], improper access control [61], and weak password recovery
mechanism [62].
The Native libraries layer is the second one exhibit-
ing the largest number of vulnerabilities (201 out of 634 =
31.7%). This is mostly due to the Media Framework subsys-
tem that has suffered of 143 vulnerabilities (129 from Google
contributions, 14 from third party contributions), including the
set of issues known as “Stagefright" [7]–[9] that are sourced
in the Stagefright library (a.k.a., libstagefright). In the
case of third-party files, the vulnerabilities are in libraries
supporting the Media framework, WiFi, Bluetooh, and
DHCP services, and the Skia library. Vulnerabilities in the
Media Framework are mostly related to issues with pointers
[63], arrays access/writing, and memory management that lead
to any type of overflow/underflow when accessing, writing,
creating, and copying buffers [64]–[66], and when perform-
ing integer operations [67]. For instance, the vulnerability
CVE-2015-3834 reported as fixed in the August 2015
bulletin has the following CVE description:
Multiple integer overflows in the BnHDCP::onTransact
function in libstagefright allow attackers to execute ar-
bitrary code via a crafted application that uses HDCP
encryption, leading to a heap-based buffer overflow [...]
This vulnerability was fixed with the commit c82e31a
that modifies the IHDCP.cpp file. The lack of buffer size
validation when computing a buffer size, was leading to heap-
based buffer overflows [66] when creating an input buffer with
the calculated size. Another example of security issue in the
Media Framework related to improper validation/restriction
of operations within the bounds of a memory buffer is
CVE-2016-0815:
The MPEG4Source::fragmentedRead function in
MPEG4Extractor.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver [...]
allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause
a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted
media file [...]
The issue can be summarized as an out-of-bounds write [68]
generated when an array offset goes beyond the buffer size.
The vulnerability was fixed in commit 5403587.
The Applications layer is the top three in the list with 88
vulnerabilities located in 18 applications developed by Google,
and 10 third-party apps.
Concerning the third-party applications, the Adobe Flash
Player is the most vulnerable app with 29 vulnerabilities;
the next more vulnerable app is Firefox (4 vulnerabilities);
Nvidia Profiler, Widevine QSEE trustzone and
Samsung OMACP are the top three with 3 vulnerabilities
each. From the 18 apps developed by Google, Browser,
Telephony, and SMS/MMS have been the most vulnerable
with 5 vulnerabilities each.
Vulnerabilities in the Applications layer are diverse
in terms of types. For example, the Android Browser had
a vulnerability (CVE-2011-0680) impacting 6 different
versions of the OS (before 2.3.4) which:
[...] allows remote attackers to obtain SD card contents via
crafted content:// URIs, related to (1) BrowserActivity.java
and (2) BrowserSettings.java [...]
The CVE-2011-0680 vulnerability is an example of infor-
mation exposure through sent data [69] because of the lack of
URIs validation in the Browser app.
The next Android OS layer more affected by vulnerabilities
is the Android Framework with 46 vulnerabilities (7.26%)
mostly located in the Activity Manager and Package
Manager. While the former is in charge of tasks such
as intents resolution and app/activity launching, the latter
manages information and handle tasks related with the Android
packages (i.e., apps) installed in the device. Conversely to the
Libraries layer that exhibits a non-diverse set of vulner-
abilities (in terms of the type), the Android Framework
has been affected by a diverse set of vulnerabilities including
code injection [70], overflows [67], permission issues [71],
business logic errors [72], missing authorizations [73], and
use of a risky cryptographic algorithm [74], among others. An
example of vulnerability in the Android Framework from
the category “Business logic errors" is CVE-2016-2500:
Activity Manager in Android [...] does not properly ter-
minate process groups, which allows attackers to obtain
sensitive information via a crafted application [...]
This vulnerability was a consequence of an invo-
cation to the killProcessGroup method in the
ActivityManagerService.java file using wrong pa-
rameters. Another example of vulnerability introduced by
business logic errors in the Android Framework layer
is CVE-2016-3923, in particular in the Accessibility
Services that “mishandle motion events, which allows
attackers to conduct touchjacking attacks and consequently
gain privileges via a crafted application".
The HAL, and Android Runtime layers are the ones
less impacted by vulnerabilities with 19 and 14 vulnerabilities,
respectively. The interface for media components is the most im-
pacted component from HAL. As for the Android Runtime,
most of the vulnerabilities affect core libraries such as Apache
Harmony, Bouncy Castle, and Conscrypt; only two
vulnerabilities were reported for the Dalvik VM. Finally,
5 out of the 634 vulnerabilities (0.79%) vulnerabilities (not
included in the heatmap) were manually assigned to different
#Days
500 600 700 800 900 1,000 1,100 1,200 1,300 1,400
all
400
low
moderate
high
critical
Fig. 5. RQ3: Survivability in days of Android-related vulnerabilities. Green
(red) depicts minimum (maximum) estimates at 95% confidence interval. Black
shows the results of the random effect model.
layers because the patches modified diferent layers of the
Android OS stack; those vulnerabilities are CVE-2016-3760,
CVE-2010-4832, CVE-2015-3843, CVE-2016-2496, and CVE-
2016-3889.
C. How long does it take to fix security vulnerabilities in
Android?
Fig. 5 depicts the forest plots reporting the survivability
of Android-related vulnerabilities (i.e., the number of days
between the vulnerability introduction and its fixing). As
explained in Section III-A, we report the minimum (green) and
the maximum (red) survivability intervals as computed with
the SZZ algorithm. In each forest plot the square represents
the average value of the distribution, while the line passing
through it depicts the 95% confidence interval. Fig. 5 shows
the survivability intervals when considering all the analyzed
vulnerabilities together (top part of Fig. 5) as well as when
grouping them by severity (low, moderate, high, and critical).
Finally, the black line shown for the overall set of vulnerabilities
depicts the results of the random effects model [75], used in
meta-analysis to combine the results of different studies in a
single result outcome. In our case, the set of “different studies”
includes the survivability estimates when considering the
minimum (study I) and the maximum (study II) survivability.
The first thing that leaps to the eyes from the analysis of
Fig. 5 is the very long survivability of the analyzed Android-
related vulnerabilities. Indeed, even when considering the most
conservative results (i.e., the minimum estimated survivability—
green line), the number of days needed to fix an introduced
vulnerability is, on average, 724 (it grows to 907 for the
random effects model, and to 1,093 for the maximum estimated
survivability). It is important to note that this is not the number
of days needed to fix a vulnerability after it has been reported,
but after it has been introduced. This means that a vulnerability
could remain unnoticed in the system for years before being
identified, possibly exploited, and then fixed. While it would
have been interesting to also analyze the time actually needed
for the vulnerability fixing (i.e., the number of days between
the vulnerability reporting and fixing), we did not find a way
to reliably identifying the reporting date.
This very long survivability of the Android-related vulner-
abilities was surprising for us at a first sight, especially due
to the young age of the Android OS. Thus, we manually
inspected twenty randomly selected vulnerabilities in order
to verify whether strong imprecisions of the SZZ algorithm
were there affecting our findings. Note that such a sample is
not statistically significant, but just meant to show qualitative
examples about the extracted data.
Overall, we found the estimates provided by the SZZ
algorithm to be precise. In particular, in 13 of the inspected
cases the SZZ identified a single commit as the vulnerability-
fix-inducing one. In all these cases the identified commit was
correct. In the remaining seven cases, multiple commits were
identified by the SZZ algorithm as the possible responsible
for the vulnerability introduction. In all these cases, either the
minimum or the maximum vulnerability estimate was correct.
In the following, we discuss some examples of manually
inspected vulnerabilities.
The vulnerability CVE-2015-1538 has been reported in
the August 2015 security bulletin and is described as follows:
Integer overflow in the Sam-
pleTable::setSampleToChunkParams function in
libstagefright in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I allows
remote attackers to execute arbitrary code [...]
Such a vulnerability has been fixed in the commit cf1581c
made on the 8th April 2015, having commit message Fix
several ineffective integer overflow checks and modifying the
file libstagefright/SampleTable.cpp. By inspect-
ing the diff of such a commit, three lines were changed to fix the
integer overflows [76]. The SZZ algorithm correctly identifies
the commit edd4a76e performed on the 28th July 2014 as the
vulnerability-inducing commit (thus, the vulnerability survived
in the system for 254 days). Indeed, in such a commit the
three lines causing the integer overflows and then fixed were
introduced all together, as it can be seen from the commit diff
[77]. Note that this is one of those cases in which the SZZ
algorithm identified a single commit as the responsible for
inducing the vulnerability-fix. This was the case for 110 out
of the 201 vulnerabilities (55%) considered in RQ3.
For the vulnerability CVE-2015-6608 we identified in-
stead multiple commits as the possible responsible for the
vulnerability introduction. This vulnerability is described as
follows:
[...] allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or
cause a denial of service (memory corruption) [...]
The vulnerability has been fixed in the commit 8ec845c (com-
mit note: stagefright: check IMemory::pointer() before using
the allocation) made on the 15th May 2015 and modifying two
lines [78] in media/libstagefright/ACodec.cpp.
These two lines were modified for the last time by two
different commits, one performed on the 21st February 2012
(i.e.,5778822) and one performed on the 2nd May 2013
(i.e.,054e734). Each of these commits introduced one of the
two lines then fixed in 8ec845c thus, they were both correctly
identified as vulnerability-inducing commits.
In this case, the commit 054e734 contributes to the
“minimum survivability distribution” depicted in green in Fig. 5
(the survivability is 742 days), while 5778822 contributes
to the “maximum survivability distribution” depicted in red
in Fig. 5 (survivability=1,179 days). Clearly, in this case the
correct survivability estimate is 1,179, since the vulnerability
was there (at least in part) since the 21st February 2012.
When looking for the survivability of vulnerabilities having
different severity levels, we were not able to identify any clear
trend: It is not possible to assert that vulnerabilities having a
higher severity have a higher/lower survivability with respect
to those having a lower severity (or vice versa). This is visible
both from the forest plots (see Fig. 5) and confirmed by the
statistical analysis, in which we did not observe any significant
difference (all the adjusted p-values were higher than 0.05).
V. THREATS TO VALIDITY
Threats to construct validity concern the relation between
the theory and the observation, and in this work are mainly due
to the measurements we performed. This is the most important
kind of threat for our study, and is related to:
RQ1 and RQ2: Subjectivity in the manual classification. We
identified through manual analysis the types of vulnerabilities
(RQ1) and the subsystems (RQ2) they affect. To mitigate
subjectivity bias in such a process, two authors (A1 and A2)
manually analyzed half of the vulnerabilities each. Then, A1
checked the vulnerability types and the impacted subsystems
assigned by A2 and vice versa. Finally, the authors discussed
the cases of disagreement, reaching an agreement on the correct
classification needed. Also, when the type of the vulnerability
and/or the impacted subsystem was unclear, we preferred to
exclude the vulnerability from the study rather than risking to
introduce imprecisions.
RQ3: Approximations due to identifying bug-inducing com-
mits using the SZZ algorithm [79]. We used heuristics to
limit the number of false positives, for example excluding
blank and comment lines from the set of bug-inducing changes.
Also, we computed both the minimum and the maximum
survivability estimates on the basis of the SZZ outcome,
showing that in any case the main outcome of our study
did not change: Android-related vulnerabilities survive for
long time. Moreover, the manual analysis performed on some
vulnerabilities confirmed the validity of our experimental design
to assess the survivability of vulnerabilities.
RQ3: Imprecision due to tangled code changes [80]. We
cannot exclude that some vulnerability-fixing commits grouped
together tangled code changes, of which just a subset was
focusing on the vulnerability fix. This would result in impreci-
sions when running the SZZ algorithm on the fixing commit.
Again, by presenting both the minimum and the maximum
survivability estimates such a risk is mitigated.
Threats to internal validity concern external factors we
did not consider that could affect the variables and the
relations being investigated. When analysing the survivability
of vulnerabilities (RQ3) we considered the severity of the
vulnerability as a confounding factor to be controlled.
We are aware that many other factors could influence the
survivability, and we plan to analyze them in future work. To
reinforce the internal validity, when possible, we integrated the
quantitative analysis with a qualitative one.
Threats to conclusion validity concern the relation between
the treatment and the outcome. Although this is mainly an
observational study, wherever possible we used an appropriate
support of statistical procedures, integrated with effect size
measures that, besides the significance of the differences found,
highlight the magnitude of such differences.
Threats to external validity concern the generalization of
results. In RQ1 and RQ2 we considered 660 vulnerabilities,
while the RQ3’s findings are based on the analysis of 201
vulnerabilities due to the need for identifying the vulnerability-
fixing commit (see Section III-A for details). Clearly, the
number of Android-related vulnerabilities that can be studied
will increase in the future, and larger replications of our study
will be possible.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We analyzed 660 Android-related vulnerabilities from three
different perspectives: (i) the types of the vulnerabilities and
their hierarchical relationships, (ii) the layers and components
from the Android software stack impacted by the vulnerabilities,
and (iii) the survivability of the vulnerabilities (i.e., the time
required to fix a vulnerability since its introduction).
The achieved results show that most of the vulnerabilities
are related to improper restriction of operations in the bounds
of memory buffers, issues processing data (e.g., numeric, type,
and string errors), improper access control, and improper input
validations. This suggests that most of the vulnerabilities can
be avoided by relying on secure coding practices especially
in the context of data handling and memory access/allocation.
Such practices could be enforced, for example, via just-in-
time quality control techniques statically analyzing the code
contributed to the Android OS in each commit activity. Also,
mobile OS developers could consider the usage of modern
programming languages embedding mechanisms promoting
secure coding (e.g., Rust [81]).
Our findings also indicate that third-party hardware drivers
are the components mostly affected by security vulnerabilities
in the Android OS, thus suggesting the strengthening of
verification & validation activities performed on them.
Finally, we showed that Android vulnerabilities survive for
long time in the code base. This stresses the importance for
researchers to invest effort in the development of automatic
vulnerability detectors tailored for the mobile world. The
taxonomy of vulnerabilities presented in this paper can be used
as a reference for the definition of the types of vulnerabilities
such detectors should target. The design and implementation
of effective vulnerability detection tools for mobile OS/apps is
part of our future research agenda.
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